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Marcuse on Art and Technology1 
 
Andrew Feenberg (Simon Fraser University) 
 
 
In this paper I will argue that Marcuse’s aesthetics are deeply implicated in his concept of 
technology, and that technological change is in fact a fundamental “praxis” corresponding to his 
aesthetic theory. I will also argue that Marcuse’s “aesthetics of technology” is based on his 
theory of sensation which he developed in a peculiar synthesis of the early Marx and Freud. 
Here is how Marcuse explains his position, in an important unpublished essay collected in 
Doug Kellner’s edition of Marcuse’s papers: 
Only if the vast capabilities of science and technology, of the scientific and artistic 
imagination direct the construction of a sensuous environment, only if the work world 
loses its alienating features and becomes a world of human relationships, only if 
productivity becomes creativity, are the roots of domination dried up in the individuals. 
No return to precapitalist, pre-industrial artisanship, but on the contrary, perfection of the 
new mutilated and distorted science and technology in the formation of the object world 
in accordance with “the laws of beauty.” And “beauty” here defines an ontological 
condition—not of an oeuvre d’art isolated from real existence…but that harmony 
between man and his world which would shape the form of society (Towards 138-139). 
  
This is an astonishing paragraph. Astonishing for its wild utopianism and its total 
indifference to mainstream academic opinion and especially to Anglo-American philosophical 
orthodoxies. It is also a profoundly attractive set of propositions for those seeking a radical 
civilizational alternative to the existing society. But attractive does not necessarily mean 
convincing. Marcuse could count on a sympathetic audience for such ideas in 1970 when he 
wrote this text and others like it. We are reading this passage 38 years too late, long after the 
excitement of the New Left has died. Today, speculations such as these resonate with our 
nostalgia rather than our theories. But Habermas warns us not to be smug, situated as we are in 
the always superior future. He asks us to “do justice to the truth content of Marcuse’s analyses” 
(Marcuse, Towards 237). He is referring to Marcuse’s critique of advanced industrial society, but 
I believe that the same approach to the positive idea of a redeemed science and technology is 
also worth attempting.  
Marcuse is perhaps the most important thinker to have elaborated a radical philosophy of 
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technology. One can dismiss his writings as bound to a historical context that no longer exists or 
one can attempt to understand his ideas sympathetically in a contemporary context. This latter 
choice requires some fairly drastic revisions but seems to me worth attempting. But it is not an 
easy task to interpret Marcuse’s views in a way that communicates directly with us today. As 
Habermas notes, Marcuse presents the “truth content” of his analyses in “concepts that have 
become foreign to us” (Marcuse, Towards 237). I will try here to reformulate some of his insights 
in a language more accessible to us. Let me begin by simply elucidating the meaning of the text I 
have cited on its own terms. 
 
The concept of the “aesthetic” is ambiguous, as Marcuse points out, “pertaining to the 
senses and pertaining to art” (Towards 132). This ambiguity is not merely semantic but stems 
from a common structure. The two meanings are united in the imposition of what Marcuse calls 
“form” on a material of some sort. The senses are engaged in a practice just as is art and with 
potentially similar results. In order to show this, Marcuse introduces an unusual theory of 
sensation based on his quasi-phenomenological interpretation of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts.  
Marx claims that the senses have a history determined by social and economic development. 
The real content of experience is gradually revealed as civilization advances. There is a hierarchy 
of sensation, going from a minimal, crude encounter with the object through the full realization 
of its complexity and beauty. A dog may hear a symphony but it will not hear what its master 
hears. The human being at home in the world under socialism will find more in nature than the 
impoverished and alienated worker under capitalism.  
The aesthetic in both senses of the term is invoked here. Like the practice of art-making, the 
“practice” of sensation involves on the one hand objects rich in meaning and on the other 
subjects capable of receiving that meaning. This reception is not passive but involves granting 
form to the given. Marx corrects in this way the over-emphasis on the object in empiricism and 
the subject in Kantian idealism. His theory corresponds to what Adorno refers to as a 
“mediation” theory of sensation in which both object and subject contribute to the shaping of 
experience. 
The unusual feature of Marcuse’s Marx interpretation is the emphasis he places on Marx’s 
surprising notion that while the animals appropriate nature only to satisfy their needs, “man 
constructs also in accordance with the laws of beauty” (Marx 128). Marcuse develops Marx’s 
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brief mention of beauty as an objective characteristic of the real—it has “laws”— in terms of a 
quasi-Freudian theory of the erotic. He argues that the erotic impulse is directed toward the 
preservation and furtherance of life. It is not merely an instinct or drive but operates in the 
sensuous encounter with the world that reveals it in its beauty, the objective correlate of the 
erotic. But this impulse is repressed by society, partially sublimated, partially confined to 
sexuality. The loss of immediate sensory access to the beautiful gives rise to art as a specialized 
enclave in which we perceive the trace of erotic life affirmation.  
According to Marcuse, aesthetic form is a kind of simplification and idealization that reveals 
sensuously the true essences of things, things as they would be redeemed in a better world. Form 
is active in sensation as well. In sense experience it gives rise not only to appreciation of beauty 
in the world but also to a critical repulsion toward all that is life-destroying and ugly. Marcuse 
argued that the New Left and the counter-culture gave us a hint of what such a transformed 
sensorium would be like. 
These reflections on the senses provide the link between Marcuse’s theories of art and 
technology. Technology is a product of reason and so distinct from art with its erotic inspiration. 
But Marcuse claims that modern value-neutral technological rationality is a distortion of an 
original life-affirming reason. Reason arose to protect and further life and lost that function in 
modern times only by being stripped back to a bare remnant of itself. This is Marcuse’s account 
of what he calls the “new mutilated and distorted science and technology” in the passage I cited 
earlier. 
The notion of rational life affirmation requires imaginative input of some sort. In the past 
reason aimed at discursive comprehension of the ideal form of its objects, their essence, that is, 
the objects’ unfolded and fulfilled potentialities. The imagination is involved in the 
transcendence of the empirically given toward the essential. Thus art and reason are not entirely 
alien to each other since both involve the imagination and both reveal essences, each in its own 
way. But they have been separated by the pressures of life in class society. While art has been 
confined to a marginal realm of “affirmative culture,” reason has been reduced to an instrument 
in the struggle against scarcity. 
The elements are now in place for a radical revision of the concept of technology. Marcuse 
projects a possible future in which the life-affirming telos of art and reason would come together 
under the aegis of an eroticized sensuousness. The result would be a transformation of 
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technology and therefore of the life environment, which is increasingly mediated by technology. 
Different human beings would inhabit this world with different perceptions and concerns. This 
would be a socialism that changed not merely some superficial political and economic 
formations but the structures of reason, art, technology and experience itself. 
To sum up, the existing society, its art, technology, reason and even the experience of the 
world it makes possible, are all deviations from original forms that were richer and more unified. 
Art and technology once merged in practices directed toward the realization of the highest forms 
of their objects, essences, beauty. Experience and reason were once informed by imagination and 
sensitive to the erotic impulse which joined them in the appreciation of the essential in things. 
These original forms can be revived under the new conditions of modernity by a socialist 
revolution.  
 
This summary should make clear what Habermas meant when he claimed that Marcuse’s 
“concepts…have become foreign to us.” We find it difficult to accept an argument based on a 
notion of origins such as this one. The Freudian reference is also less convincing today than it 
used to be. Furthermore, in Freud the erotic is a subjective drive rooted in human physiology, 
whereas in Marcuse it uncovers objective structures of being. Marcuse’s teleological notion of 
reason also presupposes this transformation of anthropological categories into ontological 
categories. Life affirmation is ontologically significant and not simply an instinctual drive. Thus 
a reason that incorporates the affirmation of life in its structure is in harmony with the nature of 
things in a way that value-neutral reason is not.  
For any of these ideas to make sense, the concept of essence must be reconstructed and 
revived. The empirical form of human beings and things cannot be the last word on their nature. 
They are haunted by a negativity that refers us to their potentialities. The erotic, the imagination, 
the affirmation of life are all implicated in the essential that transcends the given. We have 
reached a stage in history when the gap between existence and essence can be closed by a new 
technology responsive to values. 
Strange as all this sounds, its elements taken one by one are not entirely alien to 
phenomenological trends that still represent an influential alternative to naturalism and 
Kantianism. The key missing element in Marcuse’s presentation of these ideas is the 
phenomenological notion of “lifeworld.” Although he mentions something he calls an “aesthetic 
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Lebenswelt” on several occasions, he never elaborates its phenomenological background (Essay  
31). Why this is so I have tried to explain in my book Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe 
and Redemption of History. But for now, let us see how the introduction of a phenomenological 
perspective is helpful in reconstructing Marcuse’s redemptive vision. 
The key problem is the ontological status of lived experience. The nature of natural science 
is totally disenchanted. It has no room for teleology, for the erotic, for any preference for life 
over death. Like Melville’s white whale, it is bleached of value and so invites subjective 
projections of every sort in the form of ever more powerful technologies serving ever more 
violent ends. Against this background, lived experience is increasingly devalued in modern 
times. It appears to be thoroughly “refuted,” useful for everyday activity but without epistemic 
credentials or ontological significance.  
Marcuse rejects the privilege of nature in this scientific sense in favour of lived experience. 
Experience is not a subjective overlay on the nature of natural science. It reveals dimensions of 
reality that science cannot apprehend in its present form. These dimensions, beauty, 
potentialities, essences, life as a value, are just as real as electrons and tectonic plates. The 
imagination which projects these dimensions is thus not a merely subjective faculty but reveals 
aspects of the real.  
But there is an ambiguity in Marcuse's approach which shows up particularly in his rather 
vague demand for a new science that would discover value in the very structure of its objects. 
Does he wish to re-enchant nature, to attribute objective qualities to it that are unrecognized by 
science? This is the most contentious interpretation of Marcuse’s thought, one which most of us 
find difficult to accept. 
But there is an alternative interpretation which also finds support in Marcuse’s writings. 
According to this alternative, experience is revalorized not in opposition to science but as an 
alternative ontological field which co-exists with science and claims its own rights and 
significance. This seems to be the implication of Marcuse’s rejection of any return to a 
“qualitative physics” (One-Dimensional 166). On this account science as we know it would evolve 
under the influence of a new socialist environment as would experience in its sphere: quantity 
and quality in parallel. The philosophical task Marcuse did not, unfortunately, undertake would 
be to delimit the spheres so as to avoid conflict since neither science nor experience possesses 
the whole truth. 
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This alternative corresponds to the phenomenological approach as it is explained in thinkers 
such as Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty. They do not endorse a regressive re-enchantment of nature 
but defend the multiplicity of points of view on reality. This operation requires a critique of the 
“view from nowhere” in order to validate the specifically engaged perceptions of a finite being in 
the world, an embodied being that belongs to a community.  
Interpreted in this way, it makes sense to claim that the perceived potentialities of objects 
have a kind of reality. There are important domains of experience to which we bring a normative 
awareness quite apart from opinions and intellectual constructions. When we encounter a 
beautiful landscape we perceive its beauty as contrasted with that which is banal or ugly in our 
environment. A sick person appears to our perceptions to fall short of the norm of health to 
which we expect conformity. The examples could be multiplied indefinitely. They show that the 
lived experience of the real is not confined to the empirically given but frequently refers beyond 
it to essential potentialities it more or less fulfils. This “two-dimensional” nature of experience 
could be extended to form the basis of the political discrimination Marcuse substitutes for the 
traditional Marxist notion of class consciousness.  
Phenomenologically considered, the erotic, which is the basis for the two-dimensional 
perception of the world, can be understood in terms of Heidegger’s concepts of “attunement” or 
“state-of-mind.” These concepts refer to the fact that sensory experience is always colored by a 
general quality of perception such as fear or anxiety, joy or hope. These qualities reveal the 
world in its various aspects. The Freudian erotic appears to do the same work in Marcuse’s 
ontological argument. But unlike the Heideggerian equivalents, it reveals the negativity of the 
world against a normative background. 
This phenomenological interpretation of Marcuse also makes sense of his attempt to unite 
art and technology in a new concept of technological rationality that would be intrinsically value-
oriented. This contribution could be developed independently of the hope in a new science which 
appears to commit Marcuse to a re-enchantment of nature he does not need to support his 
political argument. In this restricted version of his thesis we would find Marcuse claiming that 
technical disciplines can be restructured under the aegis of values such as beauty that are 
revealed in experience. The arts would appear not as antagonistic to technology but rather as 
informing it through sensitizing people to the potentialities of their objects. Something like 
Schiller’s “aesthetic education” would be at work here, but it would not be confined to character, 
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as it is in Schiller, but would extend to the technological environment in which and through 
which the individuals live. 
 
Can we make sense in contemporary terms of this vision of an aestheticized technology? 
Surprisingly, the answer to this question is “Yes,” subject to those drastic revisions I mentioned 
above. In fact we are better able to understand and develop this idea today than we were in 
Marcuse’s day. This is because the traditional notion of technology as a pure rational “means” to 
subjective “ends” has been decisively refuted by philosophy and sociology of technology in 
recent years. We no longer believe that technology is value-neutral. Rather, contemporary 
technology studies argue that technological design always incorporates values through the 
choices made between the many possible alternatives confronting the designers. Technologies 
are not mere means but shape an environment in terms of an implicit conception of human life. 
They are inherently political. But if this is so, Marcuse’s argument gains in plausibility. 
Marcuse claimed that the problem with modern technology stemmed from its value 
neutrality. Although he did not develop a proper historical account, he appears to have believed 
that premodern technology was guided by values incorporated into the standards and practices of 
craft, values that reflected a wide range of human needs. The stripping away of these constraints 
on modern technology turns it from an instrument in the service of life into an instrument of 
domination by the powerful. The task then is to recover a relationship between technology and 
values. 
This critique of value neutrality is not entirely compatible with contemporary views as it 
stands but it can be reformulated in a way that preserves Marcuse’s essential point. Consider 
value neutrality not as an achieved state of purity but as a tendency with a history. Indeed, the 
development of modern technology is accompanied by the gradual stripping away of traditional 
restraints on technical practice. The imperatives of the capitalist market underlie this tendency to 
free technology from craft values to a development oriented exclusively toward profit. Naturally, 
the pursuit of profit mediates real demands which continue to shape technical designs. No 
complete value neutrality is ever achieved, but the tendency is toward a simplification of the 
valuative constraints on design. The less technology is invested with pre-established values, the 
more easily it can be adapted to the changing conditions of the market. Hence the appearance of 
value neutrality of modern production, with its purified technical disciplines to which correspond 
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standardized parts available for combination in many different patterns with different value 
implications. 
Reformulated on these terms, Marcuse’s argument suggests a quite definite future for 
technology under socialism. Technical disciplines and technologies would be constrained by 
values related not just to profitability but more broadly to human and natural needs recognized in 
political debate. The emergence of these new constraints should not be conceived as obstacles 
but as opportunities. The capacity for innovation would be challenged by these political demands 
much as it is challenged today by market demands. The situation Marcuse foresaw is anticipated 
by the regulation of technology where it imposes life-affirming standards independent of the 
market. This is already the case in relation to environmental and medical standards to an ever 
increasing degree. Socialism would represent a shift in the balance toward far more extensive 
regulation based on far more democratic procedures. 
 
I want to conclude by arguing that Marcuse’s theory offers a powerful basis for a radical 
philosophy of technology. While political and social philosophy continue to abstract from 
technology altogether, neither phenomenological nor sociological studies of technology have 
succeeded in getting us there. Contemporary Heideggerian critiques of technology do not really 
address technology itself but only modern attitudes toward it. Don Ihde’s phenomenological 
philosophy of technology goes much further, but he simply ignores the normative elements in 
lived experience and so offers an apolitical perspective on the highly political question 
concerning technology. Science and technology studies for the most part have avoided politics 
and taken what Wiebe Bijker calls the “academic detour.” But in the age of nuclear proliferation, 
global warming and the globalization of disease, it is difficult to see how this attitude can be 
maintained. Marcuse opens the door to a political philosophy of technology closed by most 
contemporary approaches. It is time we passed through that door, each in our own way of course, 
to develop an argument with our times. 
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